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Zvi Bodie and John B. Shoven 
One of the greatest challenges facing the United States economy now and 
increasingly in the decades ahead is to provide retirement income security 
in an environment characterized by a rising ratio of retired to working age 
population and high and unpredictable rates of inflation. The institutions 
and mechanisms that are developed to meet this challenge will have an 
impact on almost every facet of  our economy. 
In the past three decades, the most salient developments in the United 
States system of retirement income provision have been a decline in the 
relative importance of family support and labor force participation of the 
aged and an increase in the role of  social security and pension plans. 
Between  1950 and  1970 the percentage of  the aged  living with  their 
children  declined  from 31%  to 9%. Today fewer than 3% of  elderly 
households receive income from their children. and these contributions 
represent less than 1% of  the income of  the elderly. Furthermore, be- 
tween 1950 and 1980 the proportion of men aged 6.5 and over participat- 
ing in the labor force fell from 40%  to 20%.' 
Difficulties in financing an extended retirement without major family 
support have been eased considerably by sizable increases in real social 
security retirement benefits. Between 19.50 and 1980 the proportion of 
elderly households receiving such benefits rose from 20% to 9096, and 
the average level of  real benefits tripled. These benefits now represent 
the major source of income for 54% of the aged. However, the continued 
provision of real social security benefits at levels stipulated under current 
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law  is  becoming  a  subject  of  debate as demographic  changes have, 
according to many experts, placed the system in a long-term financial 
crisis. Changes in fertility rates are expected to lower the ratio of social 
security contributors to beneficiaries from the current value of 3.2 to 1.5 
by  the year 2040. Unless significant actions are taken or unless these 
projections are in error, social security tax rates have been projected by 
some to rise as high as 25% by the early part of the next century to meet 
projected benefits. 
A number of experts, therefore, think that an increasing share of the 
burden of retirement income provision in the future will fall on employer- 
sponsored pension plans. Like social security, these pension plans have 
grown rapidly over the past three decades. Between 1950 and 1980 the 
percentage of elderly households receiving benefits from these plans grew 
from 10% to over 30%. 
In addition to its impact on retirement income security, the growth of 
pension plans raises some important questions for labor and financial 
markets. For example, how will it affect labor mobility and the participa- 
tion of  older persons in the work force? What impact will it have on the 
size and allocation of  the nation’s stock of  capital? 
The National  Bureau of  Economic Research project on public and 
private  pensions  was  established  to explore  issues  such  as  these. A 
comprehensive program of study of the economic impacts of  pensions 
was begun in 1980 and has so far generated numerous working papers and 
journal articles. Appendix A at the end of  this introduction contains a 
complete list of them. In addition to these research papers, the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research has published a fact book, Pensions in the 
American  Economy  by  Laurence J. Kotlikoff  and  Daniel  E. Smith, 
whose purpose is to provide a reference base of  pension data that is 
accessible to a wide audience. 
The present volume is the first in a series of three planned conference 
volumes,  and  it  concentrates on the financial  aspects  of  the pension 
system. The second volume will deal with the role and impact of pensions 
on the United States labor market, and the final one will deal with the 
special issues faced by public pension plans. Most of the chapters in this 
volume were originally presented as papers at a conference at Amelia 
Island Plantation, Florida,  held March 2426,1982, and we have included 
the discussants’ comments on each of these. 
In this introduction, we intend to give the reader an overview of the 
issues discussed and the findings reported in these papers, making refer- 
ences to other selected NBER research papers published elsewhere. We 
group the papers and our discussion of  them according to the following 
seven questions: 
1. How financially sound is the private pension system in the United 
States? 3  Introduction 
2. What are the rights and obligations in a corporate defined-benefit 
pension plan? 
3. What is the impact of  taxes and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of  1974 (ERISA) on corporate pension policy? 
4.  Is  a  firm’s unfunded  pension  liability  correctly  reflected  in  the 
market value of its common stock? 
5. What is the impact of inflation on the private pension system, and 
how desirable and feasible are alternative indexing schemes? 
6. What is the role of  a mandatory, pay-as-you-go public pension plan 
such as Social Security in a free market economy such as that of  the 
United States? 
7. What is the current financial status of the elderly, and how vulner- 
able are they to inflation? 
How Financially Sound Is the United States 
Private Pension System? 
In recent years there has been great public concern about the financial 
soundness of  the United States retirement income system. Much of  this 
attention has focused on the Social Security system, but some doubts 
have been raised regarding the financial soundness of corporate pensions 
as well. The question is whether United States corporations have suf- 
ficient  assets in  their pension  plans  to pay for the promised pension 
benefits. 
To examine this issue, one must first distinguish between two basic 
pension  types:  defined  benefit  and  defined  contribution.  A  defined- 
contribution plan is one in which the sponsor’s obligation is completed 
when it makes contributions to a retirement investment fund in trust for 
the employee. In many cases, workers have some choice as to the invest- 
ment vehicle in which these funds are deposited,  but the worker bears the 
entire risk of the performance of  the investment portfolio. No explicit 
retirement annuity is promised during the accumulation period, and on 
reaching retirement age the worker receives the total amount accumu- 
lated in the form of  a lump sum distribution or an annuity. Defined- 
contribution plans are always fully funded by  definition. 
The typical defined-benefit plan is a corporate promise to pay retire- 
ment benefits based on the retiree’s number of years of  employment and 
level of earnings during the immediate preretirement years. Although an 
employee generally forfeits any claim to benefits when he or she leaves 
the company after only a few years of employment, the benefits of  an 
employee who stays with  a firm for some minimum number of  years 
become  “vested.” That is, the employee becomes entitled to benefits 
even if he or she subsequently leaves the company before retirement age. 
Firms must set aside tax-deductible funds to meet these future benefit 4  Zvi BodietJohn B. Shoven 
obligations, and the income on these assets is not taxed  to either the 
corporations or the pension plan itself. Some firms fund all of their vested 
pension obligations, but many do not. 
In 1980 there were an estimated 616,642 private pension plans in the 
United States, an enormous growth from the 14,671 plans in existence in 
1951. Approximately 65% of plans  in existence in  1980 were  defined 
contribution. Defined-benefit plans, however, were much larger on the 
average and covered about three-quarters of  the plan participants. 
There are basically  two approaches to determining  the value  of  a 
corporation’s  defined-benefit  pension  obligation:  the accrued-benefit 
method and the projected-benefit method. Accrued-benefit liabilities are 
essentially “shutdown” liabilities. They equal benefit obligations a plan 
would face if it terminated operation and paid off vested benefits and, in 
the case of total accrued-benefit liabilities, unvested benefits, using only 
past service and past levels of earnings to compute benefits. Projected 
benefit liabilities equal the present expected value of  benefit payments 
payable to current participants, assuming the plan continues in operation 
and that service and earnings of active participants increase at projected 
rates, less the portion  of  that present  expected  value  attributable  to 
future service. 
The vested accrued pension liability of a firm is an enforceable legal 
claim. However, in certain circumstances unvested accrued benefits also 
represent legal liabilities of  the pension plan. Under ERISA, unvested 
accrued  liabilities are residual  claims  on a  terminating  private  plan, 
provided that the plan’s assets exceed its vested accrued liabilities. Total 
and vested accrued liabilities are currently reported by most major cor- 
porations in accordance with the 1980 recommendation of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board.’ 
Projected-benefit methods, on the other hand, allocate the firm’s pen- 
sion costs attributable to a worker according to a formula that ignores the 
legal accumulation of a worker’s benefits. The various projected-benefit 
methods use different formulas for allocating costs between the past and 
the future. The proportion of  the present expected value of future pen- 
sion benefits attributable to past service under a given projected-benefit 
cost method is that method’s projected liability. 
Many economists and actuaries consider legal definitions of  pension 
liability too narrow for purposes of  judging the appropriate degree of 
pension  funding  or the  true claim  on  plan  sponsors.  Legal  pension 
claims-vested  accrued benefits and, potentially, unvested accrued bene- 
fits-are  paid, in  practice,  only  in the case of  plan  termination.  For 
ongoing pension plans that provide rapid growth in pension benefits as 
the worker accumulates more service and/or earns a larger wage, the 
assets required to fund projected liabilities will, in general, exceed those 5  Introduction 
required to fund accrued liabilities based on past service and earnings 
experience. 
For ongoing plans, projected  benefits may represent implicit, if  not 
legal,  claims on plan  sponsors.  Contractual  models of  labor  market 
behavior view workers and employers as entering into long-term agree- 
ments in  which  the worker provides  a time path  of  labor services in 
exchange for a time path of  total compensation.  Within these models 
there need be little or no relationship between this year’s labor effort and 
this  year’s compensation.  In this  context,  projected  pension  benefits 
simply represent one component of the employer’s long-term compensa- 
tion obligation, and projected rather than accrued liabilities may be most 
relevant for considering the interactions of  pensions and economic be- 
havior. For example, young workers who consider joining a particular 
firm will consider the firm’s projected pension benefit offer as well as its 
projected path of nonpension compensation in making their decision. 
In contrast with this contractual view of labor markets, traditional spot 
labor market theories predict that new hires consider only their immedi- 
ate wage and accrued pension compensation.  For young workers covered 
by plans with long service requirements for vesting, the value of immedi- 
ate pension accrual may be zero. If employers have effectively committed 
themselves to a long-term level of worker compensation including pro- 
jected pension benefits, then it is projected rather than accrued unfunded 
liabilities that represent a claim on the plan sponsor’s nonpension assets 
and future profits. 
In a series of  papers on this subject, Jeremy 1. Bulow (1979,1981a) has 
argued in favor of valuing the pension liability using the accrued-benefit 
approach even in the case where a plan termination or worker separation 
is  not  anticipated.  Initially,  he  assumes  a  labor market  in  which  an 
employee’s  total  compensation  in  each period,  salary  plus  pension 
accrual, equals the value of his marginal product. If the wage were set so 
that  it  plus  the  increase  in  promised  pension  benefits  exceeded  the 
employee’s marginal product, it would pay for the firm to either termi- 
nate the plan or fire the employee. Because both employee and firm know 
this, they each assess their respective pension assets and liabilities at the 
“shutdown” value. 
Alternatively, Bulow assumes a model with implicit labor contracts but 
where  the size  of the firm’s implicit  liability  is uncorrelated  with  the 
structure of  the firm’s pension  plan. He argues that firms which have 
defined-contribution  pension  plans  (such  as universities)  or even  no 
pension plan can have implicit contracts to pay old workers more than 
young  workers  just  as easily  as firms with  defined-benefit  plans.  He 
argues that it is inconsistent to assume an implicit liability for firms with 
defined-benefit plans but not for other firms, unless one can show sys- 6  Zvi BodieIJohn B. Shoven 
tematic differences in such firms. If  any implicit liability is to be calcu- 
lated, it should be based on the entire implicit  contract  between  the 
worker and the firm rather than just the pension, so if  a firm provides 
maternity or educational benefits which primarily go to younger workers 
or provides salary that is not proportional to marginal product, the firm 
should take these things into account in determining its projected liabil- 
ity. The projected-benefit  pension  cost  methods are only  right  if  it is 
assumed that the chosen projected-benefit path is tied to the difference 
between marginal product and explicit compensation each year. 
Even  if  one agrees that the vested  accrued liability  is  the relevant 
measure of pension indebtedness,  there remains the issue of what interest 
rate should be used  to compute the present value of  the deferred life 
annuities owed to plan beneficiaries. On this issue there is a fundamental 
difference between the approach taken by actuaries and that taken by 
financial economists. Actuaries in principle choose a rate representing 
the yield expected to be achieved on the plan’s assets in future years. 
Financial economists feel that the rate used  to value a firm’s pension 
liabilities ought to reflect the risk of  those liabilities and not the risk of the 
plan’s assets. Since the accrued pension entitlement is always known with 
certainty, the appropriate rate to use in computing its present value is the 
long-term riskless nominal rate.’ 
In practice, actuaries in recent years have used rates well below the 
long-term nominal riskless rates prevailing in the bond markets. But even 
using these below-market capitalization rates to evaluate their accrued- 
benefit liabilities, the majority of  pension plans of major United States 
corporations appear to be adequately funded. Financial information for 
1980, reported by approximately 1,000 of the largest corporations in the 
United  States and  compiled  by  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards 
Board, shows an average assumed interest rate of  7% with a range of 
4%-12%  per year. Using these reported interest rates, just over half of 
these companies had pension assets whose market value exceeded their 
estimated  total accrued liabilities. Adjusting the liabilities to reflect  a 
uniform capitalization rate of 10%  per year the proportion of fully funded 
or overfunded plans becomes 80% and at an interest rate of  12% this 
proportion becomes 90%  .‘ 
The Rights and Obligations in a Corporate 
Defined-Benefit Pension Plan 
In the first chapter in this volume, “Who Owns the Assets in a Uefined- 
Benefit Plan?” Jeremy I. Bulow and Myron S. Scholes take a position 
somewhat different from Bulow’s earlier one. They question the idea that 
the assets held in trust by defined-benefit pension plans of large corpora- 7  Introduction 
tions are corporate assets and that the obligation to pay employees during 
retirement is a corporate liability similar to secured debt. They feel that 
this view, which implies that any difference between the value of pension 
assets and the value of the liability is a part of shareholders’ equity, is 
overly simplistic. Instead, they believe that the employees and the stock- 
holders share ownership of  the pension fund. The equity stake of  the 
employees stems from firm-specific human capital, which allows them to 
capture some of the rents of the corporation, and from the provisions of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  Just as 
it is too simplistic to assume that in bankruptcy stockholders will receive 
nothing, Bulow and Scholes argue that it is too simplistic to assume that in 
the termination of an overfunded pension plan the workers would receive 
none of  the surplus. 
The effects of ERISA are also the subject of the second chapter in this 
volume, by  Jeremy I. Bulow,  Myron  S. Scholes,  and  Peter Menell 
(BSM), “Economic Implications of  ERISA.”  In  it  BSM  claim  that 
ERISA changed the ownership rights to defined-benefit plans through 
the establishment of  minimum vesting and benefit accrual standards, the 
establishment of the benefit insurance program, and through the defini- 
tion of  fiduciary responsibility of  plan administrators. BSM argue that 
despite these changes, the sharp increase in nominal interest rates since 
1974 has significantly reduced the impact of ERISA by drastically reduc- 
ing the present value of  vested benefits. Without this increase in interest 
rates, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the insurance 
agency established to guarantee benefits, would have faced large liabili- 
ties on the terminations of  pension plans. To prevent potentially huge 
increases in its liabilities in the future, BSM suggest that the PBGC could 
require employers to  fully fund any increases in promised benefits and to 
hedge the benefits guaranteed by  the PBGC. 
In  the third  chapter in  this volume,  “Pensions as Severance Pay,” 
Edward P. Lazear presents  a model in which defined-benefit  pension 
plans serve as a form of severance pay designed to ensure efficient labor 
mobility.  He shows  how  pension  values  which  vary  with  the age of 
retirement can make both workers and firms better off by moving the 
equilibrium  compensation  scheme  in  the  direction  of  a  perfect-in- 
formation, first-best optimum. Assuming that in the later years of life 
wages exceed the marginal productivity of labor, pension values should 
decline with  the age of  retirement  beyond a certain point in order to 
encourage workers to take early retirement. He finds support for this 
claim in data drawn from the 1980 Banker’s Trust corporate pension plan 
study. Comparing these results with those from his earlier study using 
1975 data, he finds that the ratio of  early retirement pension  value to 
normal retirement pension value has increased between 1975 and 1980. 8  Zvi BodieIJohn B. Shoven 
The Impact of Taxes and ERISA on Corporate Pension Policy 
A number of papers in the NBER pension project have dealt with the 
subject of optimal pension funding and asset allocation in the presence of 
corporate and personal taxes and ERISA. The first papers in this area 
were  those of  Fischer Black  (1980~;  also see Black  1980b) and Irwin 
Tepper (1981). The models in both papers imply that firms with defined- 
benefit pension plans can increase the value of the firm by funding or even 
overfunding their plans  (even  if  this increases the firm’s nonpension 
liabilities) and by investing the pension assets in what would normally be 
fully taxable bonds. Both of these results are due to the tax-shelter nature 
of  pension plans and to their assumption that the assets of  the plan are 
really owned by the firms rather than by its employees. The authors argue 
that in the absence of default risk the firm’s liability to its vested workers 
is  independent of  the assets of  the plan,  and that  it is  ultimately  the 
stockholders of  the firm whose situation  is  affected by  the investment 
results of  the pension  assets.  In a  subsequent  paper, Bulow  (1981b) 
looked at a somewhat broader set of  assumptions, although in  several 
cases he, too, found that bonds were the optimal asset for defined-benefit 
plans. 
In the fourth chapter in this volume,  “Optimal  Funding  and Asset 
Allocation Rules for Defined-Benefit Pension Plans,” J. Michael Harri- 
son and William s. Sharpe address this range of  issues.  Harrison and 
Sharpe explicitly examine default risk and the role of ERISA, as well as 
the tax considerations of  the previous papers. They conclude that the 
current tax  and  insurance  policies  of  the  United  States government 
regarding pensions make it optimal for firms to follow extreme funding 
and investment strategies. They show that, given the trade-off between 
the insurance and tax effect, the optimal policy for a firm would generally 
involve either (1) full funding plus investment solely in bonds, (2) mini- 
mum funding plus investment solely in stocks, or (3) full funding and 
investment solely in stocks. 
In the fifth chapter in this volume, “Pension Funding, Pension Asset 
Allocation, and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Individual Company 
Data,”  Benjamin  M.  Friedman  looks  for  systematic  empirical  rela- 
tionships between the composition of  a corporation’s balance sheet and 
the management of its pension fund. Friedman uses a merged data set on 
individual companies assembled from Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
files and from the United States Department of Labor’s Form 5500 files. 
The chief conclusion, on the basis of  data for 7,828 pension  plans 
sponsored by 1,836  companies and their subsidiaries, is that corporations 
do  not manage the pension plans which they sponsor as if these plans had 
nothing to do with the corporation. Different responses appear to char- 
acterize firm’s behavior in different contexts, but the evidence persist- 9  Introduction 
ently indicates clear relationships between decisions about pension assets 
and liabilities and decisions about the other assets and liabilities of  the 
firm. At the same time, the pattern of these relationships is, more often 
than not, inconsistent with the conclusions of the optimal pension fund- 
ingiasset allocation models developed at the theoretical level by Black, 
Tepper, and  Harrison  and Sharpe. In addition,  Friedman  finds some 
evidence  that corporations time  their  pension  contributions  so as to 
smooth their reported earnings, but earnings smoothing also does not 
provide an explanation for underfunding of pensions (as is often claimed) 
since such behavior is as prevalent among firms with fully funded as with 
underfunded plans. 
Another aspect  of  pension  asset  allocation  concerns the long-term 
nature of the commitment. In the sixth chapter in this volume, “Investing 
for the Short and the Long Term,” Stanley Fischer considers how the 
relative riskiness of  stocks and bonds changes with  the length  of  the 
“holding  period,”  defined  as the  length  of  time  between  successive 
portfolio revisions. He finds that in the United States the relative riski- 
ness of stocks declines the longer the holding period because bill returns 
are more highly serially correlated than stock returns. But this does not 
greatly  affect  the optimal  allocation  between  stocks and  bonds. For 
typical untility functions, the optimal portfolio is very concentrated  in 
stocks, although Fischer does not take account of the tax advantages of 
bonds discussed in the previous chapter. 
Pension Obligations and Share Prices 
In the seventh chapter in this volume, “Pension Funding Decisions, 
Interest Rate Assumptions, and Share Prices,” Martin S. Feldstein and 
Randall Mmck attempt to assess the extent to which the market value of 
firms reflects accurately their unfunded pension obligations. The interest 
in  this  issue  is  in examining the  efficiency of  capital  markets  and in 
determining whether or not unfunded pensions dcpress national saving. 
If  the unfunded liability is not reflected in a lower market value for the 
firm, the pension plan would create the appearance of  an asset from the 
worker’s point of view without a signal to the firm’s owners that they are 
poorer. If, on the other hand, security values reflect the unfunded nature 
of  the plan, the owners of the firm may save more on their own accounts 
to maintain their current wealth. 
Using a new body of data on 132 firms, Feldstein and M~rck  find that 
the market sets values that are related more closely to a pension obliga- 
tion evaluated at a common standard interest rate than to the pension 
obligations as reported by the firms. This common interest rate, however, 
appears to be much lower than the long-term market interest rate prevail- 
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those liabilities is overstated. They also find evidence that the market 
may undervalue pension assets. This combination of overstated liabilities 
and understated assets may suggest that the expanding size of the private 
pension system may increase total savings by companies and their share- 
holders. 
Inflation and Indexation 
Much  of  the recent  discussion about the relation  between  private 
pensions and inflation has emphasized the adverse impact that the unex- 
pected  rise  in  inflation during the past  15 years has had  on pension 
recipients and on the performance of pension funds. Some of  those who 
have commented on the problem have even concluded that the private 
pension system cannot survive in an inflationary economy. It is impor- 
tant, however, not to confuse the unfortunate consequences that fol- 
lowed when inflation caught pensioners and pension fund managers by 
surprise with the inability to adjust to future conditions, even uncertain 
future conditions. 
In a previous study, Feldstein (1981~)  concluded that a steady rate of 
inflation, far from destroying the pension system,  would actually increase 
the share of  total savings that goes into private pensions. The reason for 
this conclusion  is that the advantage that the private pension  has in 
exempting its portfolio income from  taxation  becomes greater when 
there is inflation. This, in turn, reflects the fact that individuals pay tax on 
the full  nominal interest  income that they earn on direct saving and 
therefore pay a tax per unit of  capital that rises with the rate of  inflation; 
in contrast, of  course, since pensions pay no tax on their interest income, 
the tax  differential per unit  of  capital rises  with  inflation.  Similarly, 
individuals pay tax  on nominal capital gains on  stock (as well  as on 
dividends), and this capital gains tax also implies a tax per unit of  capital 
that  rises with  the rate  of  inflation. Thus, on both debt and equity, 
inflation increases the yield differential between household and pension 
funds in favor of pensions. 
The uncertainty about future inflation makes long-term nominal con- 
tracts like private pensions extremely risky from the perspective of  both 
the employees and the plan sponsor. Why, then, are private pensions not 
indexed? In the eighth chapter in this volume, “Should Private Pensions 
Be Indexed?” Feldstein offers a possible explanation: the availability of 
an optimal (or greater than optimal) amount of  social security generally 
reduces the desired degree of  indexing and,  under a variety of conditions, 
makes it optimal to have no indexing at all in the private pension. 
Indexation is also the subject of  the ninth and tenth chapters in this 
volume.  In  “Observations on the  Indexation  of  Old Age Pensions” 
Lawrence Summers concludes that alternative indexing arrangements 11  Introduction 
may have far less impact on actual patterns of risk bearing than is usually 
thought to be the case and that insofar as the introduction of  inflation 
indexing has real effects, there is no presumption that they are beneficial. 
The absence  of  indexed  private  pensions  may  not  necessarily reflect 
market failure, but rather may reflect the tendency of competitive capital 
markets to allocate risks efficiently. Summers also points out that advo- 
cates of a large social security system may be opposed to the indexation of 
benefits because if indexation makes it more difficult to cut benefits in bad 
times, the level of indexed benefits offered in good times will be lower. 
In  his  chapter, “On  Consumption  Indexed  Public  Pension  Plans,” 
Robert C. Merton considers the merits and feasibility of  a mandatory 
fully funded savings plan in which required contributions and benefits are 
indexed to aggregate per capita consumption. He argues that people care 
about others and, among other things, will not let them starve in retire- 
ment. From this, we get a classical example of the “free-rider’’ problem 
which cannot be solved by the private markets but can be solved by an 
appropriately designed mandatory pension system. 
A  second  argument in favor  of  such a  system is the possibility  of 
economies of  scale in  information costs. Virtually everyone faces the 
decision problem  of  how much  to save for retirement and in what to 
invest those savings during their working years. If  a pension plan were 
designed which reasonably approximated the plan which most individuals 
would choose if they were informed, then by making participation in the 
plan  mandatory, the resources used  in  individual education  and data 
gathering would be saved and the maximum benefits of pooling to reduce 
operating costs could be achieved. 
Merton suggests aggregate per capita consumption as the appropriate 
base for indexation because of the known theoretical result that life-cycle 
investors will optimally hold portfolios whose returns are perfectly corre- 
lated with aggregate consumption. Although his analysis is made within 
the framework of a public pension plan, it applies equally well to orga- 
nized private pension plans where participation is virtually mandatory 
and where individually designed programs are not practical.  An addi- 
tional feature of  the plans examined is that they provide for life annuities 
during both the accumulation and retirement phases of the life cycles. 
In thc eleventh chapter in this volume, “Retirement Annuity Design in 
an  Inflationary  Climate,” Zvi Bodie and James Pesando consider the 
desirability and feasibility of “performance” indexing as an alternative to 
price-level indexing of  private pensions. They examine the tilt and risk- 
return characteristics of  real retirement incomes provided  by  variable 
annuities tied to bills, bonds, and stocks and contrast them with conven- 
tional nominal annuities. Their analysis emphasizes the downward tilt 
and riskiness of  the stream of real benefits provided by the conventional 
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rates of  inflation.  They also  consider  several  innovations  in  annuity 
design, which  have appeared in recent  years in response  to increased 
inflation  uncertainty, and show  them to be variants  of  the standard 
variable  annuity. They interpret the ad hoc cost-of-living adjustments 
made by  many  large  firms  in  recent years  as a form of  performance 
indexing. 
Role of Social Security 
In the twelfth chapter in this volume, “On the Role of  Social Security 
as a Means for Efficient Risk  Bearing in  an Economy Where Human 
Capital  Is  Not  Tradable,”  Robert  C. Merton  explores  one possible 
economic function of  a “pay-as-you-go” public retirement plan such as 
social security: to eliminate the inefficiencies caused by the nontradability 
of human capital. 
Merton develops an intertemporal general equilibrium model of  an 
economy with overlapping generations and two factors of  production, 
labor and capital. He then uses it to analyze the economic inefficiencies 
caused by the nontradability of human capital and to derive a constrained 
Pareto-optimal system  of  taxes  and transfers  which  “corrects”  these 
inefficiencies. He  shows that, in the absence of such a system, this market 
failure causes the equilibrium path of  the economy to deviate from the 
optimum for two  reasons.  First,  people  cannot achieve  their optimal 
life-cycle consumption program because early in life when most of  their 
wealth is in the form of human capital they cannot consume as much as 
they would otherwise choose. Second, investors cannot achieve an opti- 
mal portfolio allocation of their savings. Not only will some investors be 
forced to bear more risk than they would choose in the absence of this 
market failure, but because factor shares are uncertain, the portfolios 
held by investors will be inefficient.  The young are “forced”  to invest 
“too much” of their savings in human capital and the old are “forced” to 
invest “too little” in human capital. Hence, all investors bear “factor- 
share” risk which, if human capital were tradable, could be diversified 
away. Merton shows that an optimal system of  taxes and transfers not 
unlike the current social security system can eliminate this inefficiency, 
and, therefore, he suggests that a latent function of  the present system 
may be to improve the efficiency of  risk bearing in the economy. 
Pensions and the Financial Status of the Aged 
In the thirteenth chapter in this volume, “The Economic Status of the 
Elderly,” Michael  Hurd and John B. Shoven present  a picture which 
contrasts sharply with some popularly held views. All of  their calculations 
indicate that on average the elderly did relatively well economically over 13  Introduction 
the decade of the 1970s and that they were not particularly vulnerable to 
inflation. The aggregate data show that incomes of the clderly increased 
faster than incomes of the rest of  the population even though the labor 
force participation  of  the elderly declined.  A  substantial part of  the 
elderly population was protected against inflation, and those who were 
highly vulnerable were concentrated among the wealthy, who were better 
able to tolerate the inflation risk. 
Finally, in the fourteenth chapter in this volume, “Portfolio Composi- 
tion and Pension Wealth: An Econometric Study,” Louis Dicks-Mireaux 
and Mervyn  A. King  examine  the impact  of  pension  wealth  on  the 
composition of household asset holdings. Using cross-sectional data for 
10,118 Canadian households, they found that whereas there seems to be 
an identifiable  effect of  pension wealth  on total  saving, the effect on 
portfolio composition was less significant and was mainly in terms of the 
number and combination  of  different  assets  held  rather than  in  the 
amount of  any given asset as a proportion of total wealth. 
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Notes 
1. See Retirement  Income  Opportunities in  an  Aging  America: Income  Levels  and 
Adequacy, Employec Benefit Research Institute. 1982, p. vi. 16  Zvi BodielJohn B. Shoven 
2.  When accrued benetits are  calculated for company annual reports, nonvested accrued 
benefits are multiplied by a projection of  the proportion of  the benefits which will become 
vested. There are some other projections (e.g., with regard to early retirement) that make 
the currently used accrued-benefit methods less than pure. 
3. See, e.g.,  Treynor (1977). 
4.  In adjusting the present value of  accrued benetits to reHect market capitalization rates 
the following approximation was used: 
u  = b( rim) ' 75, 
where a = adjusted value of  accrued benefits, b = book value of accrued benefits. r = book 
interest rate assumption, and m = market interest rate. Thc computations were done by 
Wayne  Landsman  under  the direction  of  Jeremy  Bulow.  using  data  from  the  FASB 
Statement 33 Data Bank. 
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